Theory guiding practice: the neofunctionalists and theHallstein EEC Commission by White, Jonathan
  
Jonathan White 
Theory guiding practice: the 
neofunctionalists and the Hallstein EEC 
Commission 
 






White, Jonathan (2003) Theory guiding practice: the neofunctionalists and the 
 Hallstein EEC Commission. Journal of European Integration History, 9 (1). pp. 111-131. ISSN 
0947-9511 
 
© 2003 The Author 
 
This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/65019/ 
Available in LSE Research Online: January 2016 
 
LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the 
School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual 
authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any 
article(s) in LSE Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. 
You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities 
or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE 
Research Online website.  
 
This document is the author’s final accepted version of the journal article. There may be 
differences between this version and the published version.  You are advised to consult the 




 \\lse.ac.uk\storage\LIBRARY\Secondary\libfile\shared\repository\Content\White, J\Theory Guiding 
Practice\White_Theory_Guiding_Practice_author.doc - 15/01/16 
 
1 
Theory Guiding Practice: the Neofunctionalists and the 
Hallstein EEC Commission 
 
Jonathan P. J. White 
 
 
It has become a widely accepted dictum within the social sciences 
that all theory is rooted in the circumstances of its authors.
1
 
Political and International Relations theory is contingent on 
time and place, and may not be read as a neutral response to some 
form of ‘objective reality’. In the words of Robert Cox, ‘theory 
is always for someone and for some purpose’.2 Such an observation 
stands as one of the essential legacies of post-positivist 
thought. 
 
Arguably this leaves the point only half-made, however, for 
in many cases the relationship between scholarly theory and its 
subject matter is dialectical. Just as a theoretical model, 
explanatory or predictive, will exhibit the assumptions and the 
concerns of the environment in which it was conceived, so the 
course of decision-making in any practical field is apt to be 
guided, whether by deliberate prescription or silent influence, 
by the dominant intellectual currents of the day.
3
 ‘The foreign 
policy of a nation’, it has been written, ‘addresses itself not 
to the “external world”, but to the image of the external world 
that is in the minds of those who make foreign policy’.4 Clearly, 
whenever theoretical influences on this image (in particular one 
dominant influence) exceed a certain level, there may be 
consequent difficulties for effective policy-making. The 
schematisation which is a necessary component of all theorising 
can be a constriction when it is taken up by those who fall 
within its compass. The ability to meet and overcome challenges 
in the policy-making process, in whatever sphere, requires a 
plurality of views, a plurality of perspectives on what are 
problems and what are solutions. Where this is lacking, political 
stagnation or misadventure may follow. 
                                                          
1 For their guidance in the preparation of an earlier draft of this work I 
should like to thank Dr. Julie Smith and Dr. Geoffrey Edwards of the 
University of Cambridge. For its financial assistance, I am grateful to Corpus 
Christi College, Cambridge. 
2 R. COX, Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International 
Relations Theory, in: Millennium, 10.2(1981), p.128. 
3 For a discussion of one instance of this, the impact of Game Theory and 
statistical models on U.S. foreign and defence policy in the 1950/60s, see F. 
KAPLAN, The Wizards of Armageddon, Simon & Schuster, New York, 1983. 
4 A. GEORGE, The “Operational Code”: a Neglected Approach to the Study of 
Political Leaders and Decision-making, in: International Studies Quarterly, 
13.2(1969), p.191. 
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Academic and political discourse in the years and decades 
following the end of the Second World War saw many attempts to 
conceptualise the course of European history and to analyse the 
options available for its future development. To those who felt 
the War had exposed the bankruptcy of the traditional balance-of-
power relationship between the continent’s powers, the 
‘federalist’ cause, understood as the advocacy of progression 
(whether directly or incrementally) towards a system of 
centralised regulatory power, was an attractive proposition and 
one that came to be adopted by many of the leading statesmen of 
the post-war era (amongst others, Konrad Adenauer, Winston 
Churchill and Jean Monnet). The common goal, moderated from one 
individual to the next, was some form of European unification, 
with a spectrum of views on the means by which this should be 
achieved, ranging from the ‘functionalist’ approach of Monnet, 
which emphasised the potential of cooperation in specific 
technical tasks eventually to lead to some kind of pooling of 
sovereignty, to the more directly constitutional approach of men 
such as Altiero Spinelli. 
 
In the 1950s and 1960s, a series of further perspectives on 
European integration emerged. Economists sought ways of 
determining the prerequisites of a successful common market.
5
 
International law theorists looked at ways in which sovereignty 
might be pooled, and considered the constitutional arrangements 
most appropriate to post-War Europe.
6
 And in political science, 
several schools of thought developed, each with its own 
particular perspective on the relations between states and how 
these might best be directed. ‘Liberal internationalists’ such as 
Inis Claude stressed the potential of supra-national institutions 
to manage international relations; ‘intergovernmentalists’ like 
Stanley Hoffmann argued that such institutions in Europe could do 
little more than reflect the immediate interests of the major 
nation-states, whilst ‘transactionalists’ such as Karl Deutsch 
highlighted the potential of travel, trade and telecommunications 
for creating peaceful interdependence.
7
 In the late 1950s, the 
work of the American Ernst Haas added a new methodological 
rigour, and perhaps a more prescriptive thrust, to the thinking 
of the federal functionalists, and in so doing spawned a new 
                                                          
5 For example, J. VINER, The Customs Union Issue, Stevens & Sons, London, 
1950. 
6 See, for example, M. MACDOUGAL, Studies in World Public Order, Yale 
University Press, New Haven, 1960; also 1Name MACDOUGAL and F. FELICIANO, Law 
and Minimum World Public Order, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1961. 
7 For one summary of these different academic schools, see C. PENTLAND, 
Building Global Institutions, in: 1Name PENTLAND and G. BOYD (eds.), Issues in 
Global Politics, Collier Macmillan, London, 1981, pp.326-366. 
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3 
school of integration theory which achieved a certain dominance 
in the academic field in the early to mid-1960s: 
‘neofunctionalism’. 
 
As Europe, then, sought to rebuild itself in the years after 
the War, it did so against the backdrop of a very considerable 
amount of conceptual self-reflection. And yet in much of the 
historiography written on this period, this flow of ideas has 
tended to be underestimated, attention focused instead upon ‘the 
events themselves’. ‘The true origins of the European Community’, 
according to the leading historian Alan Milward, ‘are economic 
and social’.8 The significance of beliefs and individual 
perceptions, argues the historian and social scientist Andrew 
Moravcsik, should be limited ‘to cases in which material 
interests are weak or uncertain’, as though the interpretation of 




Michael Burgess, in a recent examination of the role of 
federalist ideas in the early years of the European Community, 
has argued that historical revisionism, in seeking to do away 
with the imprecision of earlier accounts and their focus on the 
role of the individual, has in turn negated unjustifiably the 
significance of the goals and visions of the early figures of 
European integration. With reference to federalists such as 
Monnet, Spinelli, Schuman, Beyen and Spaak, Burgess writes that 
‘their significance could be found in what Milward’s dour 
Gradgrind approach ignored, namely, the political context of the 
post-war debate about European integration’.10 An account of 
European integration which places paramount emphasis on socio-
economic realities (understood as objectively pre-existing 
political evaluation) usually requires the assumption of a 
coherence and rationality of action often absent; it will also 
fail to discern the ideational concerns in the context of which 
critical decisions are made. 
 
The focus of this paper is on the events of 1965-66 – the 
time of the ‘Empty Chair’ crisis in Europe, when French President 
Charles de Gaulle withdrew his country’s representatives from the 
Council of ministers, thereby paralysing the work of the European 
institutions. The Commission of the European Economic Community 
was at this time under the presidency of Walter Hallstein, a 
                                                          
8 A. MILWARD, The European Rescue of the Nation-State, 2nd ed., Routledge, 
London, 2000, p.xi. 
9 A. MORAVCSIK, De Gaulle and European Integration: Historical Revision 
and Social Science Theory, in: Harvard CES Working Paper Series, 8.5, May 
1998, p.77. 
10 M. BURGESS, Federalism and European Union: the Building of Europe, 1950-
2000, Routledge, London, 2000, p.63. 
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former German Foreign Office minister who had first come to 
prominence in European affairs as leader of the German delegation 
to the Schuman Plan negotiations in 1950. By examining the 
overlap of ideas between the Commission and various academics of 
the time, and by subsequently analysing in some detail the course 
of political events in 1965, this study will attempt to ascertain 
how far the Commission was guided in its policy-making by beliefs 





Admittedly no single theoretical discourse had exclusive 
influence on decision-makers in this period. Work has already 
been conducted on the significance of contemporary legal, 
economic and federalist theoretical discourse for Hallstein and 
his Commission. The historian Matthias Schönwald has written on 
the extent to which Hallstein’s constitutional understanding of 
federalist structures was derived from the teachings of Heinrich 
Triepel, one of Hallstein’s professors whilst a law student in 
1920s Berlin, and the Genossenschaftslehre of German legal 
philosopher Otto von Gierke, who had taught another of 
Hallstein’s university mentors, Martin Wolff.12 Economic 
theorists likewise were highly valued by a Commission which saw 
one of its main tasks as the creation of a European customs 
union. Richard Mayne, an adviser to Hallstein in the early 1960s, 
has emphasised the significance for Hallstein of a United Nations 
report produced in 1947 concerning the creation of customs 
unions.
13
 Also discernible in the source material is a high 
regard for the work of two economics professors in particular, 
Jacob Viner (author of The Customs Union Issue, 1950, and 
International Economics, 1951) and James Meade (author of 
Problems of Economic Union, 1953). 
 
Yet legal and economic theory are arguably more relevant to 
the development of Hallstein’s thought than to its more complete 
form in 1965-66. True enough, law was the foundation on which the 
Communities rested, and hence the ultimate justification for all 
actions taken, but the Treaty of Rome was a highly complex and 
                                                          
11 In the analysis that follows, extracts from the speeches, conversations 
and writings of Hallstein are quoted in the original language; for all other 
sources, English translations have been used where these exist in published 
form. 
12 M. SCHÖNWALD, Walter Hallstein and the “Empty Chair” Crisis 1965/66, in: 
W. LOTH (ed.), Crisis and Compromises: The European Project 1963-69, 
Veröffentlichungen der Historiker-Verbindungsgruppe bei der Kommission der 
Europäischen Gemeinschaften, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2001, pp.159-160. 
13 United Nations, Report, Customs Unions: A League of Nations Contribution 
to the Study of Customs Union Problems, United Nations, New York, 1947. Cited 
in an interview with the author, London U.K., March 2001. 
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nuanced agreement, and how one chose to interpret it would always 
be dependent upon factors that lay outside the field of law, 
dependent upon views held on political matters. Similarly, the 
specifics of economic integration could never constitute more 
than one dimension to the overall process of European 
integration. As Commission President, Hallstein thought of 
himself as far more than an economic coordinator for the six 
national governments. He saw his role primarily as a political 
one. Both economic and legal theory provide useful starting-
points for looking at the evolution of Hallstein’s thinking on 
European integration, but if one wishes to understand the full 
nature of his thought then one must consider its political 
dimension also. 
 
‘Federalism’, as expressed in the ideas of Monnet, was 
undoubtedly a crucial influence on Hallstein. Monnet’s role in 
the founding of the European Coal and Steel Community meant that 
he and his ideas on European integration were always likely to be 
held in affection by members of the EEC Commission. His links to 
Hallstein were particularly close. As Hallstein explained in a 
BBC interview in spring 1972, 
 
‘It worked between us from the very first moment; we had the 
same – should I say – antenna, and so we have very rapidly 
become really intimate friends […] it’s a personal 
friendship, an all-round friendship if I may say so’.14 
 
The ways in which they articulated their strategies for 
constructing the new European order are strikingly similar. Both 
used the metaphor of a chain reaction to describe the integration 
process,
15
 and both felt that some kind of ‘federalism by 
instalments’ was the best way forward.16 In the incrementalism of 
his approach, Hallstein clearly displays the legacy of his close 
association with Monnet. Ultimately, however, Hallstein was less 
restrained in his federalist ambitions than Monnet, a feature 
that the historian Matthias Schönwald has drawn attention to,
17
 
and one that is readily apparent when one looks at Hallstein’s 
                                                          
14 Bundesarchiv Koblenz (BA) N 1266-2493. 
15 J. MONNET, A Ferment of Change, in: Journal of Common Market Studies, 
1.3(1962), p.208; Hallstein in T. OPPERMANN (ed.), Europäische Reden, Deutsche 
Verlags-Anstalt, Stuttgart, 1979, p.541. 
16 J. MONNET, op.cit., p.208; W. HALLSTEIN, speech to the New York Council 
on Foreign Relations, March 1965, BA N 1266-1946, pp.5-6. 
17 M. SCHÖNWALD, “The same – should I say – antenna”: Gemeinsamkeiten und 
Unterschiede im europapolitischen Denken von Jean Monnet und Walter Hallstein 
(1958-63), in: A. WILKENS (ed.), Interessen verbinden: Jean Monnet und die 
europäische Rolle der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Bouvier, Bonn, pp.269-297. 
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speeches towards the mid-1960s.
18
 Moreover, a reading of the 
sources suggests that there were dimensions to his understanding 
of political integration, especially by 1964-65, that cannot be 
classified in terms of the functionalist-federalist discourse of 
which Monnet was the most significant proponent. To view 
Hallstein as simply a disciple of Monnet is to neglect the 
complexity of his political thought in its mature form.  
 
It is the discourse of ‘neofunctionalism’ – clusters of 
ideas, concepts and categorisations which had their origins in 
the work of a certain school of academic scholars – which, I wish 
to suggest, is needed to complete the survey of influences. This 
is particularly true in the light of new evidence which suggests 
that its significance for Hallstein, and for one of his advisers 
in particular, was considerably greater than has been recognised 
to date. 
 
The type of discourse analysis used in the following 
approach has a number of distinctive methodological features: 
notably, the discourse under examination is assumed to be of a 
peculiarly manufactured quality; that is, with its origins lying 
primarily in the world of systematically devised ideas (the work 
of various integration theorists), rather than in ‘ritualised 
social practices’19 generative of patterns of thought and 
behaviour. It is not so much the discursive impact of Foucault’s 
‘disciplines’ (patterns of behaviour at the micro-level) which 
will concern us here; rather, the emphasis will be on the 
limiting power of specific modes of thinking at the macro-level. 
In this sense, perhaps the model which conforms most closely to 
the aims of this study was that presented by Alexander George as 
far back as 1969. The ‘Operational Code’, as it was known, sought 
to identify the ‘instrumental’ and the ‘philosophical’ beliefs of 
decision-makers – the former being the very kinds of belief which 
are discussed here. But methodologically (and not just in its 
brittle name!), the Operational Code betrays its origins in the 
1960s behaviouralist movement, and perhaps George’s most relevant 
advice is that ‘questions of data and methods [should] be 
approached in an eclectic and pragmatic spirit’.20 Paul Chilton 
has recently employed an updated version of this kind of 
                                                          
18 Compare J. MONNET, op.cit., p.206, where he portrays the Community 
structure as sui generis rather than federal, with Hallstein’s speech to 
higher EEC officials, 30 September 1963 (BA N 1266-968, p.10), where he speaks 
of the Community as ‘bereits … eine Quasi-Föderation’. 
19 M. HAJER, The Politics of Environmental Discourse: Modernisation and the 
Policy Process, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1995, p.53. 
20 A. GEORGE, op.cit., p.221. 
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7 
discourse analysis in Security Metaphors,
21
 a study of the 
significance of the metaphors employed by foreign policy advisers 
during the Cold War; but his approach, though it provides a 
valuable examination of the constraining effect of certain 
patterns of thinking, contains little that is analogous to the 
following attempt to link a specific theoretical discourse to the 
understanding of decision-makers.  
 
 
The Neofunctionalists and the Hallstein EEC Commission 
 
The principal figures of the neofunctionalist school were: Ernst 
Haas, professor at the University of California, Berkeley, author 
of the seminal 1958 book The Uniting of Europe,
22
 and as such the 
recognised founder of the school; and Leon Lindberg, of the 
University of Wisconsin, author of several major works of 
neofunctionalist theory in the mid-1960s.
23
 Also researching in 
Brussels at this time, in collaboration with Lindberg, was Stuart 
Scheingold, assistant professor at Wisconsin. These individuals 
constituted an academic school in the true sense: though there 
were certainly a number of differences of emphasis between them, 
their work was marked by fundamental agreement on all the 
essential questions of perspective, also by the use of a common 
body of descriptive terminology and by much cross-referencing 
with each others’ work.24 
 
Richard Mayne, speaking in his capacity as a former adviser 
to Hallstein and Monnet, has expressed some scepticism at the 
idea that this group of academics might have helped to shape the 
political understanding of those in the Commission.
25
 As 
presented by Mayne, Hallstein’s thought appears fundamentally the 
same as that of Monnet. Yet persuasive evidence has been 
discovered, and is reproduced here, suggesting that by 1965, i.e. 
after Mayne had left the Commission, the links between the 
academic school and the institution it was studying were strong. 
 
                                                          
21 P. CHILTON, Security Metaphors: Cold War Discourse from Containment to 
Common House, Peter Lang, New York, 1996. 
22 E. HAAS, The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social and Economic Forces, 
1950-57, Stevens & Sons, London, 1958. 
23 L. LINDBERG, The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration, 
Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1963; Decision-Making and Integration in 
the European Community, in: International Organization, 19.1(1965), pp.56-80. 
24 For an overview of the neofunctionalists, see R. J. HARRISON, 
Neofunctionalism, in: A.J.R. GROOM and P. TAYLOR (eds.), Frameworks for 
International Cooperation, Pinter, London, 1990, pp.139-150. 
25 Interview, op.cit. 
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The recollections of Stuart Scheingold, who was researching 
in Brussels between September 1964 and February 1965, provide a 
useful insight into the closeness of this relationship.
26
 
Scheingold recalls developing a number of contacts at the 
Commission during his period of research (in particular Claus-
Dieter Ehlermann, an adviser in the Commission’s Legal Service 
between 1961 and 1973). Significantly, Scheingold remembers 
lunching with Karl-Heinz Narjes – Hallstein’s chef de cabinet 
from 1963 onwards – in the winter of 1964-65. At this lunch, 
Scheingold says, Narjes ‘went out of his way’ to ask him about 
neofunctionalist theory and to talk through its implications. 
Indeed, Narjes had apparently on another occasion met 
Scheingold’s colleague Leon Lindberg. Most interestingly, on that 
occasion Narjes had reportedly left the academic with the 
impression that he viewed him and his neofunctionalist associates 
as ‘consultants’ on European integration. 
 
The link between these political scientists and the 
Commission can be traced to the top of the institution. Ernst 
Haas’ Uniting of Europe is to be found in the bibliography for 
the 1962 publication of Hallstein’s Clayton lectures.27 More 
significantly, while Hallstein does not explicitly mention the 
neofunctionalists in his prominent speeches, an examination of 
the notes for one speech in particular, his February 1965 address 
to students at Kiel University, reveals that their work was not 
only familiar to him, but also highly rated by him. Some early 
drafts of this lecture may be found amongst his papers in the 
Bundesarchiv.
28
 The lecture will be frequently cited, since it 
resembles neofunctionalist thinking closely, is largely free of 
political rhetoric, dates to February 1965 – just before the 
crisis began – and also because much of the material is in 
Hallstein’s own handwriting – a clear suggestion that it directly 
reflected his personal views. 
 
In one of these drafts, written in the President’s hand, one 
finds the following passage: 
 
‘Das Beste, was die politische Wissenschaft bisher zur 
Sammlung der Tatsachen, zur systematischen Analyse und zur 
Bewertung der Vorgänge beigetragen hat, kommt aus 
amerikanischer Feder. Ich denke besonders an die Schriften, 
die Leon N. Lindberg, Professor an der University of 
Wisconsin, unserm Phänomen gewidmet hat. Ich zitiere ihn 
                                                          
26 Correspondence with the author, Seattle USA – Cambridge UK, May 2001. 
27 W. HALLSTEIN, United Europe, Challenge and Opportunity, Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge Mass., 1962. 
28 BA N 1266-1004. 
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gern, nicht nur wegen der Schärfe seiner Beobachtung und der 
konstruktiven Methode, sondern auch weil er besser als ich 
gegen den Verdacht der Befangenheit geschützt ist – als 
Außenstehender, als wissenschaftlicher Fachmann, als 
Nichteuropäer. In der positiven Würdigung des Funktionierens 
unseres Integrationsmechanismus will ich an keiner Stelle 
über ihn hinausgehen’.29 
 
This is high praise indeed. Although the paragraph did not make 
it to the final version of the speech, the fact that Hallstein 
was contemplating it (and clearly, given the handwriting, doing 
so on the basis of personal reflection), also the extent to which 
he was so comprehensively identifying his own thought with 
Lindberg’s neofunctionalism, surely is of considerable 
significance. It seems to justify the analysis of Commission 




The ‘Logic’ of European Integration 
 
By the mid-1960s, it was a central belief of Hallstein’s that the 
process of European integration could be described as a ‘logical’ 
phenomenon. Since much earlier in his Commission presidency, 
Hallstein had been asserting that ostensibly economic issues were 
also essentially political. As he made clear in March 1962, ‘die 
Realität unserer Gemeinschaft ist nicht wirtschaftliche 
Integration […], sondern […] wirtschaftspolitische 
Integration’.30 However the idea of the ‘logic of integration’, 
Sachlogik as Hallstein called it, was more complex than this, and 
in its many facets bore remarkable similarity to the work of the 
neofunctionalists. Here was the theoretical means which enabled 
Hallstein to incorporate his early belief in the unity of the 
economic and political spheres into a more comprehensive account 
of the process of European integration. 
 
It is possible that the term Sachlogik was coined for 
rhetorical purposes, as a means of justifying the various steps 
of the integration process to sceptical observers. Whatever the 
truth of this, the idea itself was in no way purely cosmetic. 
Robert Marjolin, in his memoirs, suggests that he himself was one 
of very few notable Commission figures who did not believe in the 
‘logic of integration’: 
                                                          
29 BA N 1266-1004, Fiche 3, section A7/8. For the authoritative 
identification of the handwriting here, I am indebted both to Richard Mayne 
and to Dr. Matthias Schönwald. 
30 T. OPPERMANN, op.cit., p.338. 
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‘my own reaction […] was one of extreme scepticism. I did 
not believe in the ‘engrenage’ or ‘spill-over’ theory […] 
above all [because] it would be a fundamental error to think 
that a government having to contend with acute domestic 
problems, often threatening its very existence, could be 
constrained to take crucial decisions involving 
relinquishments of sovereignty, simply because an ‘inner 
logic’, the reality of which is moreover debatable, left it 
no other alternative’.31 
 
The tone of these comments, somewhat confrontational and self-
justifying, would seem to indicate the dominance of the ‘logic-
interpretation’ amongst his colleagues. That Hallstein retains 
the idea of Sachlogik in his 1969 political resumé, Der 
unvollendete Bundesstaat, suggests it was far more than a 
rhetorical device, that it was an axiomatic principle of his 




Belief in the ‘logic’ of integration, for both the 
neofunctionalists and for Hallstein, involved a series of key 
elements. Perhaps the most fundamental of these was the idea that 
integration could be explained almost entirely with reference to 
the material ‘interests’ of the parties involved. This view was 
expressed by Haas in 1958, when he wrote that ‘major interest 
groups as well as politicians determine their support of, or 
opposition to, new central institutions and policies on the basis 
of a calculation of advantage’.33 In his lecture at Chatham House 
in December 1964, Hallstein talks of the Community as being 
founded on ‘the balancing of individual interests and Community 
interests’, whilst in his Kiel lecture Hallstein talks of 
‘Menschen, von Interessen bewegt’ and goes so far as to employ 
the English term ‘vested interests’.34 Further shared vocabulary 
may be found: ‘interest coalition’ is a term which the 
neofunctionalists were prone to using, and one which may be found 
occasionally in the texts of Hallstein.
35
 The term ‘package deal’ 
(in the sense of the packaging of competing interests into a 
                                                          
31 R. MARJOLIN, Architect of European Unity: Memoirs 1911-86, Weidenfeld & 
Nicholson, London, 1989, p.266. 
32 W. HALLSTEIN, Der unvollendete Bundesstaat: Europäische Erfahrungen und 
Erkenntnisse, Econ Verlag, Düsseldorf/Vienna, 1969, pp.20-24; p.61. 
33 E. HAAS, op.cit., p.xiv. 
34 T. OPPERMANN, op.cit., p.510; pp.535-536. 
35 HALLSTEIN, lecture, Johns Hopkins University, Bologna, 15 May 1965, BA N 
1266-1017, p.9. 
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single agreement) is one which Scheingold links to Lindberg,
36
 




The second major area of overlapping ideas can be described 
as belief in the ‘logic of spill-over’, as explained by Lindberg 
in 1963: ‘the initial task and grant of power to the central 
institutions creates a situation or series of situations that can 
be dealt with only by further expanding the task and the grant of 
powers’.38 The idea of ‘expansive tasks’ which Lindberg outlines 
is reproduced by Hallstein in a speech in October 1964: he states 
that 
 
‘jedes gemeinschaftliche Handeln schafft zugleich wieder die 
Gründe, die Notwendigkeiten für weiteres gemeinschaftliche 
Handeln […]. Täglich wächst der Kreis der Aufgaben, denen 
nur eine gemeinschaftliche Zusammenarbeit gerecht werden 
kann’.39 
 
Concern with the ‘logic’ of the enterprise had implications 
for the tactics and strategy with which integration was to be 
pursued. In several of his works, Haas describes three methods of 
resolving disputes: the ‘lowest common denominator’ method, 
‘splitting the difference’, and ‘upgrading the common 
interest’.40 Lindberg follows Haas in this categorisation in 
1963, and explores the implications of each method.
41
 It appears 
to be exactly these three different methods of conflict 
resolution which Hallstein outlines in his Kiel lecture under the 
headings ‘ein quantitativer Kompromiß’, a ‘sowohl als auch’ 
approach and ‘eine Synthese neuer Elemente’.42 Interestingly, 
Hallstein adds that conflict resolution is the very essence of 
the Community, a source of progress rather than potential danger:  
 
‘Die elementarste Kraft jeder Gemeinschaft ist die 
Verschiedenheit der Partner. […] Jeder Sieg des Gemeinsamen 
über das Besondere macht sie härter’. 
 
                                                          
36 S. SCHEINGOLD, De Gaulle versus Hallstein: Europe picks up the pieces, 
in: The American Scholar 35(1966), p.480. 
37 T. OPPERMANN, op.cit., p.538. 
38 L. LINDBERG, The Political Dynamics …, op.cit., p.10. 
39 W. HALLSTEIN, Rome, opening session of the 7th Conference of European 
Local Authorities, T. OPPERMANN, op.cit., pp.490-494. 
40 E. HAAS, ‘International Integration: The European and Universal Process’, 
International Organization 15(3) 1961, p.369; Beyond the Nation-State: 
Functionalism and International Organization, Stanford University Press, 
Stanford, 1964, p.111. 
41 L. LINDBERG, The Political Dynamics, …, op.cit., p.12. 
42 T. OPPERMANN, op.cit., p.536. 
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The concern to balance ‘interests’, to accommodate them 
within ‘package deals’, was indicative of a general inclination 
to deal with issues as a bundle, rather than individually. Here 
was another point of overlap between Hallstein and the 
neofunctionalists. If one believed in the logic of integration, 
it followed that one could never view a problem in isolation, but 
had to see it as part of a series of issues to be addressed. 
This, as Scheingold made clear, was germane to the logic-
perspective: 
 
‘the packaging of proposals as documented by Leon Lindberg 
[…] calls for the simultaneous advance in interlocking areas 
[…]. The packaging process is thus grounded on the logic of 
integration’.43 
 
Hallstein seems to have been well aware of this imperative: one 
finds him using such words as ‘synchronisation’,44 
‘equilibrium’,45 and ‘der innere Zusammenhang aller Bereiche der 
Wirtschaft und der Wirtschaftspolitik’46 to explain the need for 
packaging problems. There was an inner connection between all 
fields of integration, a connection which had to be 
‘respected’.47 
 
Indivisible from a belief in the logic of spill-over was a 
tendency to view the integration process as in some sense 
inevitable. ‘Spill-over’, as the concept was understood at the 
time, was inherently unidirectional – there was no notion of 
‘spill-back’ – and to believe in it was to believe that political 
integration was ultimately a predestined fact, whatever reverses 
it might suffer along the way. This sense of inevitability has 
been highlighted by Schönwald,
48
 and there is much in the source 
material to corroborate it. In his Kiel lecture, for example, 
Hallstein uses the Sachlogik idea to set out ‘die Gründe für die 
Nützlichkeit, die Notwendigkeit, die Unabwendbarkeit der 
europäischen Einheit’. ‘Wie die Vollständigkeit des Alphabets,’ 
he explains, ‘gibt es eine innere Einheit aller 
Wirtschaftspolitik, die stärker ist als alle Willkür politischer 
Gewalten’.49 The simile is significant, for it suggests an 
                                                          
43 S. SCHEINGOLD, op.cit., p.480. 
44 See W. HALLSTEIN, Where the Common Market Stands Today, in: Community 
Topics 13, Information Service of the European Communities, London, 1964. 
45 Lecture, Johns Hopkins University, op.cit., BA N 1266-1017, p.28. 
46 Lecture, Kiel University, op.cit., BA N 1266-1004. In the published 
version of the lecture, the phrase is ‘der unlösliche innere Zusammenhang 
aller Einzelmaßnahmen der Wirtschaftspolitik’ (T. OPPERMANN, op.cit., p.538). 
47 T. OPPERMANN, op.cit., p.541. 
48 M. SCHÖNWALD, “The same – should I say …, op.cit., pp.296-297. 
49 T. OPPERMANN, op.cit., p.524; p.537. 
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indivisible whole which is impenetrable, invulnerable to hostile 
external forces.
50
 (The simile evidently pleased Hallstein, for 
he reproduced it verbatim in Der unvollendete Bundesstaat).
51
 
Such a perspective must surely have guided his thinking on the 
extent to which president de Gaulle of France, the major 
troublesome political power, would ever successfully be able to 
challenge the advance of European integration.  
 
Of course, Hallstein and his speech-writers were always 
careful to stress that European integration was not an inevitable 
process, that it depended on political will. Much the same 
linguistic formula is used to make this point each time: ‘these 
things did not happen automatically: in politics, nothing 
does’;52 ‘let me stress that I am not suggesting that all this 
will follow automatically or without snags. In politics nothing 
does’.53 But the mantra is unconvincing. As Robert Marjolin 
recalled: 
 
[for Hallstein and those who shared his perspective], 
federal Europe was within reach, if the political will were 
there. Practically speaking, once the first step had been 
taken in this direction, events would necessarily follow on 
from one another and inevitably lead to the desired result. 
This is the gist of the so-called theory of ‘engrenage’, of 
the ‘spill-over effect’.54 
 
It should perhaps be added that a belief in the ‘logic of 
integration’ was likely to presage an interpretation of history 
which confirmed it. One sees hints of this in Hallstein’s Chatham 
House lecture, when he details how the success of the Common 
Market generated new circumstances conducive to further economic 
                                                          
50 For a discussion of the significance of metaphor choice in political 
discourse, see P. CHILTON (op.cit., Chap.2). Of the various types of cognitive 
schema that Chilton identifies, the ‘alphabet metaphor’ which Hallstein uses 
here, with its connotations of interior and exterior, would seem to be a 
‘container’ schema, implying ‘protection from, or resistance to, external 
forces’ (p.51). Its usage perhaps indicates a disposition on Hallstein’s part, 
despite what he asserts elsewhere on the unity of the economic and political 
spheres, to see the process of European integration as separate and protected 
from the realm of arbitrary high politics. 
51 W. HALLSTEIN, Der Unvollendete Bundesstaat …, op.cit., p.20. 
52 W. HALLSTEIN, Economic Integration and Political Unity in Europe, in: 
Community Topics 2, Information Service of the European Communities, London, 
1961, p.11. 
53 W. HALLSTEIN, United Europe …, op.cit., p.166. See also T. OPPERMANN, 
op.cit., p.491, and W. HALLSTEIN, Europe in the Making, George Allen & Unwin, 
London, 1972, p.46. 
54 R. MARJOLIN, Architect of European Unity …, op.cit., p.265. 
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 One may assume that in early 1965, after the 
reasonably successful deal on cereal prices in December 1964, 
belief in the ‘logic of integration’ was seen to have been 
vindicated.
56
 A sense of the inevitability of the integration 
process was therefore, in parallel with the notion of the ‘logic 
of integration’, at its peak in the early months of 1965.  
 
Finally, a shared perspective on the role to be played by 
economic, bureaucratic and political elites in the process of 
spill-over may be found. For both the neofunctionalists and 
Hallstein, the need to create new identities and to change the 
loyalties of elite groups was one of the fundamental tasks of the 
integration project. The neofunctionalists called this shifting 
of loyalties the ‘system transformation effect’.57 This was a 
term which Hallstein included in his Kiel lecture.
58
 It is there 
in the hand-written version of the lecture. It is also to be 
found in an abridged version published in the April 1965 edition 
of EEC Bulletin where, although several sections of the speech 
are cut, the phrase ‘system transformation effect’ is retained, a 
move that suggests its inclusion in the original lecture was not 
just tokenism designed to appeal to students of political 
science, but that it was considered of genuine explanatory worth. 
 
The developed form of this belief in the ‘logic’ of 
integration, comprising the various points examined above, is not 
present in Hallstein’s earliest texts. One does not find mention 
of Sachlogik, for example, with its cognitive (rather than purely 
economic) connotations, in Hallstein’s 1961 lectures at Tufts 
Massachusetts, even though these deal with ‘The Economics of 
European Integration’ and ‘The Politics of European Integration’ 
and are directed at academic audiences – precisely where one 
might have expected to find it. One hears of the logic of 
economic integration, which is ‘compelling and inexorable’, but 
in 1961 this is not yet extended into the social and political 
spheres.
59
 Nor does one find it in another academic lecture in 
1961, ‘Wirtschaftliche Integration als Faktor politischer 
                                                          
55 T.OPPERMANN, op.cit., p.512. 
56 For a summary of these negotiations and the positive response to their 
conclusion, see M. CAMPS, European Unification in the Sixties: From the Veto 
to the Crisis, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1967, pp.23-28. Note also 
Camps’ observation (p.35) that Hallstein was, by spring 1965, in the wake of 
the successful resolution of several protracted sets of negotiations, prone to 
‘confuse crises with progress’. 
57 1Name LINDBERG, ‘Decision-Making’, pp.58-60. was not jet quoted: 1name, 
editor, place date  
58 T. OPPERMANN, op.cit., p.525. 
59 W. HALLSTEIN, United Europe …, op.cit., p.58. 
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Einigung’, given at Freiburg University.60 Around 1962, one sees 
the introduction of the word ‘Zwang’ into speeches – ‘ein 
logischer Zwang’; ‘mit einem inneren Zwang ergibt sich […] die 
Notwendigkeit des Aufbaus einer eigenen Wettbewerbsordnung’.61 
But only from around 1964 onwards (after the publication, one 
should note, of Lindberg’s Political Dynamics of European 
Economic Integration) is the logic of spill-over, political and 
social as well as strictly economic, to be found in the sources. 
 
As has already been emphasised, the relationship between the 
neofunctionalists and the Commission was reciprocal, and part of 
the correlation in perspectives must be due to the fact that the 
former were modelling their studies on the work of the latter. 
Basic notions of spill-over predated the neofunctionalists and 
are present in the earlier discourse of Monnet and Hallstein 
himself; by repeating and developing these the neofunctionalists 
were simply reinforcing beliefs which were, in outline form, 
already in circulation. Equally, it must not be assumed that 
Hallstein and his speechwriters adopted neofunctionalist theory 
wholesale once it came to their attention. Hallstein was never ‘a 
neofunctionalist’. What can be observed, rather, is what one 
might call a series of ‘organising beliefs’, beliefs about the 
very nature of the process of European integration and the role 
of the Commission within it, which bear many of the essential 
elements of the neofunctionalist discourse – the vocabulary, and 
with the vocabulary many of the key ideas. On the basis of the 
above these can be recapitulated as beliefs in: a) the 
determining integrative pressure of material interests; b) the 
logic of spill-over; c) a strategy of treating problems 
collectively, and a specific set of tactics for resolving 
disputes; d) the virtual inevitability of the integration process 
(and a view of history that confirmed this); and e) the need to 
transfer the loyalties of the economic, bureaucratic and 
political elites to the Community level. 
 
These beliefs were not, perhaps, without a degree of self-
contradiction in places. To what extent, for example, was it 
reasonable to articulate one’s political goals, and seek to 
engineer them, if one saw the progress of integration as being 
led by an anonymous material logic? Indeed, might not a stated 
aim interfere with the conduct and policy-making of certain other 
actors, and hence disrupt the flow of this material logic? These 
beliefs did not necessarily form a coherent whole, but 
nonetheless do seem to have played a significant role in shaping 
the way the integration process was conceptualised by certain key 
                                                          
60 T. OPPERMANN, op.cit., pp.243-254. 
61 Ibid., p.338; p.375. 
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figures in the Commission towards the spring of 1965 – Hallstein 
and, one may infer from his contact with Lindberg, Hallstein’s 
chef de cabinet Karl-Heinz Narjes. 
 
 
The Commission and the ‘Empty Chair’ Crisis, 1965/6 
 
The background to the 1965 crisis was as follows. The first five 
years of Hallstein’s presidency of the EEC Commission, from 1958 
to the end of 1962, had been a period of some considerable 
success. Progress on the steps towards integration time-tabled in 
the Treaty of Rome had been such that, in October 1962, the 
Commission had predicted that the customs union would be 
completed three years ahead of schedule, by 1 January 1967.
62
 In 
January 1963, the first major difficulties of the Community’s 
short history arose when de Gaulle vetoed the British application 
for Community membership. This was an unpopular move amongst all 
the other five member states, and an impasse was resolved only by 
virtue of a package deal that tied further negotiations on the 
British question with progress in matters important to the French 
– most notably, agriculture. Thus it was that one of the most 
significant issues in Community affairs in the period which 
interests us here was integration in agricultural matters, and 
the establishment of a Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). 
 
Progress was slow for much of 1964. The setting of a common 
price for cereals had developed into something of a stumbling 
block, and the French, anxious to see advances made, had become 
agitated. Alain Peyrefitte, the French minister of Information, 
had announced in Le Monde on 22 October 1964 that France would 
‘cease to participate’ in the EEC if the common market for 
agriculture ‘was not organised as it had been agreed that it 
would be organised’.63 There was a general sense of relief, 
therefore, when, on 15
 
December of that year, a deal on cereal 
prices was finally agreed. This left the financing of the CAP as 
the next major issue on the agenda, proposals on which the 
Council of ministers asked the Commission to have ready by the 
end of March 1965. 
 
 The Commission’s response to this request forms the 
central subject of our analysis, for it was these proposals that 
ultimately sparked the so-called ‘Empty Chair’ crisis. As asked, 
the Commission put forward regulations on the financing of the 
common agricultural fund; but, controversially, it introduced two 
                                                          
62 See the Memorandum on the Action Programme of the Community for the 2nd 
Stage, Brussels, 24 October 1962, in: EEC Bulletin, 12.8(1962). 
63 M. CAMPS, op.cit., p.17. 
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extra dimensions to its proposals, beyond what the Council of 
ministers had specifically been looking for. First, it included 
provisions for replacing the system based on member states’ 
financial contributions with one that allowed the Community to 
have its own financial resources, to be raised through tariffs on 
industrial imports as well as frontier price-equalisation levies 
on agricultural products. In proposing this the Commission was 
greatly enhancing the financial powers of the Community (and thus 
of itself); it was also directly snubbing previous French policy 
on the question of own resources, which had been to have them 
drawn instead from frontier levies and tariffs on agricultural 
imports alone – the rationale being presumably that, if own 
resources were to be introduced at all (and it is probable that 
the French had little enthusiasm for them in any form), it would 
be Germany and, potentially, Britain that would be the main 
contributors. Second, the Commission proposed that, so as to 
regulate the new powers it would now wield through these own 
resources, the European Parliament be given new authority to 
oversee the Community budget (a move which would require 
modification of Articles 201 and 203 of the Rome Treaty). 
 
The 31 March 1965 proposals thus contained three elements, 
rather than the original single element – proposals on the 
financing of the CAP – envisaged by the Council of ministers. The 
French, interpreting this as a bid for power, reacted angrily 
when the proposals were put before the Council of ministers for 
discussion in June of that year, and ultimately refused to 
negotiate any further. In July, de Gaulle withdrew the French 
representatives from the Council in protest, leaving the French 
chair empty. It would remain so until January 1966, leaving the 
other Five to conduct only the most routine of Community 
business. The Community was essentially paralysed for six months. 
 
What, then, caused the Commission to formulate its proposals 
in such far-reaching fashion? The French had already made it 
clear in the course of 1964 that they would not accept the 
extension of Commission and European parliamentary powers
64
 – so 
why did the Commission create a package linking that which the 
                                                          
64 See H. VON DER GROEBEN, The European Community: the Formative Years 
(1958-66), Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 
Luxembourg, 1985, p.260. He paraphrases the warnings of French Foreign 
minister Couve de Murville in autumn 1964. See also de Gaulle, in a press 
conference 31 January 1964, where he sets out what he sees as the proper 
distribution of power within the Community: ‘executive power and duty belongs 
to the governments alone’, with the Commission being in no sense an 
‘executive’, but ‘a meeting, however qualified it may be, of international 
experts’ (cit. in L. de MÉNIL, Who Speaks for Europe? The Vision of Charles de 
Gaulle, Weidenfeld & Nicholson, London, 1977, p.147). 
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French emphatically opposed with that which they strongly 
desired, the completion of the CAP? And then, when France’s 
disapproval was evident, why did the Commission not swiftly 
moderate its proposals so as to reach consensus?  
 
Much has been written on the question of whether the ‘Empty 
Chair’ crisis was the inevitable clash of pro- and anti-
integrationists, or whether it was a simple case of political 
mismanagement on the part of the Commission.
65
 This polarises the 
argument unnecessarily. The clash was indeed a clash of concepts, 
of fundamental perspectives on the very nature and objectives of 
European integration.
66
 But that is not to say that the crisis 
had to happen; rather, in the years and months leading up to 
March 1965, policy-makers in the Commission somewhat 
unfortunately came to adopt a series of convictions and beliefs 
which encouraged them to misjudge and hence to mishandle the 
political situation. 
 
The previous section set out the ‘organising beliefs’ which 
could be tied to contemporary neofunctionalist theory. Here, 
these beliefs are linked to the Commission’s decision-making in 
1965. The intention is not to give a mono-causal account of the 
crisis; these beliefs did not determine Commission policy, rather 
they set the terms on which it was made, and encouraged certain 
courses of action over others. 
 
One issue has to be addressed at the outset: that of who was 
involved in formulating the March 1965 Commission proposals. 
Robert Marjolin, the French Commissioner, recalls in his memoirs 
that the ‘triple deal’, as the proposals came to be known, was 
‘entirely the brainchild of Hallstein, who had won [Sicco] 
Mansholt [the Dutch Commissioner for Agriculture] over to it. The 
project had been drawn up in the utmost secrecy by a few of their 
collaborators, the other members of the Commission being 
                                                          
65 For contemporary perspectives, see M. CAMPS, op.cit.; J. LAMBERT, The 
Constitutional Crisis, 1965-6, in: Journal of Common Market Studies, 
4.3(1966), pp.195-228; and J. NEWHOUSE, Collision in Brussels: The Common 
Market Crisis of 30 June 1965, Faber & Faber, London, 1967. For a more recent 
view, see W. LOTH, Hallstein und de Gaulle: Die verhängnisvolle Konfrontation, 
in: W. LOTH, W. WALLACE and W. WESSELS (eds.), Walter Hallstein: der 
vergessene Europäer?, Europa Union Verlag, Bonn, 1995, pp.171-188, esp. 186-
187. 
66 That de Gaulle was acting partly with regard to issues of sovereignty 
generally, and not purely those connected to agriculture, is acknowledged even 
in the work of Moravcsik, where commercial considerations are given primary 
emphasis. See A. MORAVCSIK, De Gaulle between Grain and Grandeur: the 
Political Economy of French EC policy, 1958-70 (Part 2), in: Journal of Cold 
War Studies, 2.3(2000), pp.37-40. 
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carefully kept out of the picture’.67 Mayne’s account of the 
drawing up of the proposals confirms that very few were involved 
in the process, and also indicates the identity of the 
‘collaborators’ that Marjolin mentions: the triple deal was 
‘cooked up by Karl-Heinz Narjes and Ernst Albrecht, who was a 
colleague of his, and sold to Hallstein’.68 On the basis of both 
these accounts, and given that his final approval would certainly 
have been required, the emphasis so far placed on the thinking of 
Hallstein himself seems fully justified. 
 
The triple deal reflects the stated organising beliefs in a 
number of ways. Mayne has argued that the thinking behind the 
deal was to seek to take advantage of French interest in the 
agricultural question as a means of pushing through further acts 
of integration in other areas.
69
 This would seem to be predicated 
on the idea that the French had too much to lose from pulling out 
of the integration process, even if they realised they were being 
manipulated; predicated, in other words, on the assumption that 
French policy was determined by ‘interests’ that followed a 
‘logic of integration’. 
 
That domestic commercial interests in France generally 
precluded an anti-integration stance certainly seems to be 
something that the neofunctionalist Lindberg believed in 1965: 
 
‘De Gaulle does not act without regard for the internal 
repercussions. His decision to bar the British from 
membership in the EEC was certainly supported by the 
overwhelming majority of French elites, but the opposite 
would be the case were he to withdraw from the Community or 
even to practise an “empty chair policy”’.70 
 
Were Lindberg’s views of any significance specifically for the 
formulation of the March proposals? In his lecture at the British 
Institute of International and Comparative Law, Hallstein 
mentions that academic advice was usually sought when the 
Commission was drawing up proposals: 
 
‘Um zu solchen Lösungen zu gelangen, verläßt sich die 
Kommission bei der Ausarbeitung ihres Vorschlages nicht 
allein auf den Sachverstand ihrer Beamten; sie versucht 
vielmehr, die Ansichten unabhängiger Wissenschaftler, der 
                                                          
67 R. MARJOLIN, Architect of European Unity …, op.cit., p.350. 
68 R. MAYNE, interview, op.cit. Mayne is quite firm on this point: ‘it was 
cooked up by these two people, Narjes and Albrecht’. 
69 Ibid. 
70 L.? LINDBERG, Decision-Making, op.cit., p.75. 
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betroffenen Wirtschaftskreise und der nationalen 
Verwaltungen kennenzulernen und zu berücksichtigen’.71 
 
Lindberg undoubtedly fits the description of ‘unabhängiger 
Wissenschaftler’ – indeed, in Hallstein’s handwritten notes for 
the Kiel lecture, it was precisely Lindberg’s objectivity 
(together with his competence) that was underlined. Finally, it 
is known that Narjes met with Lindberg in this period, and that 
he was inclined to regard Lindberg as something of a 
‘consultant’.72 Given that (if one follows Mayne’s account) 
Hallstein and Narjes were two of the three people involved in 
formulating the March 1965 proposals, there seems to be a good 
case for arguing that Lindberg’s neofunctionalism was indeed a 
meaningful influence. 
 
The proposals also convey the ‘logic of integration’ in as 
far as they indicate a sense of the unity of all policy-making 
and a concern to bundle together issues which were ostensibly 
separable. It was the logic of funding the Community’s ‘own 
resources’ through both the agricultural and the industrial 
sectors, even though only the CAP and agricultural issues were 
formally on the agenda, and of proposing also the extension of 
the Parliament’s powers, which impressed Hallstein, as is clear 
from a speech made in June of the same year: 
 
‘Hier haben wir schon ein schönes Beispiel für ein 
Gleichgewichtsproblem: wir können gar nicht dieses eine 
Stück vollenden, ohne daß sich sofort die Frage stellt, was 
mit den anderen Stücken wird. Wird die Sache nicht schief, 
gerät sie nicht ins Rutschen, wenn wir uns auf das eine 
beschränken? […] Das ist unsere Ausgangsthese, wie Sie 
wissen’.73 
 
It should be noticed how Hallstein refers to it as an ‘example’ – 
an example indicative of a broader pattern of sector spill-over. 
 
Finally it is worth noticing that the inclusion in the 
triple deal of the extension of European parliamentary powers 
conformed to the neofunctionalist sense of the need to win 
greater popular legitimacy for the Community, and thereby 
transfer elite and popular loyalties away from the national 
governments towards the centre. It was, as Hallstein said in 
                                                          
71 T. OPPERMANN, op.cit., p.549. Hallstein makes the same point in his Kiel 
lecture (p.532). 
72 S. SCHEINGOLD, correspondence?, op.cit., p.page?. 
73 Europahaus Marienberg, 26 June 1965, BA N 1266-1023, p.19. 
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October 1964, a question of ‘democratisation’.74 Is it not 
possible that this aspect of the proposals was inspired in part 
by the notion of ‘system transformation effect’, which, as we 
have seen, seems to have made an impression on Hallstein? 
 
 
Clash of paradigms 
 
Hallstein evidently saw the logic of integration as expressed in 
the integrative impulse of competing material interests 
(Sachlogik, after all, meant ‘material logic’). He saw de 
Gaulle’s political options, therefore, as constrained by material 
forces that favoured further integration. This is evident in a 
report of a conversation between Hallstein and McGeorge Bundy, 
U.S. Presidential special assistant for National Security 
affairs, on 29 March 1965: 
 
‘da die Bauern und ihre Organisationen die größte 
wirtschaftliche Widerstandsgruppe des Generals sei, habe 
nunmehr das Zustandekommen des Agrarmarkts auch für de 
Gaulle die Bindung an die EWG irreversibel gemacht’.75 
 
The neofunctionalist theorist Lindberg – arguably the critical 
influence on Hallstein’s Sachlogik – had, as we saw above, come 
to the same conclusion that de Gaulle had too much to lose 
domestically from an ‘empty chair’ policy.76 
 
The problem was, of course, that de Gaulle most certainly 
did not see the issues of European integration as indivisible in 
the way that Hallstein did, nor did he wish to forge a new 
European identity for the French people. His concept of Europe 
was one of limited economic cooperation, ultimately according to 
what he decided was in France’s best interests. In several 
speeches he had made clear his hostility towards any moves to 
extend the Community’s supra-national powers.77 Indeed, recent 
research suggests that commercial considerations may actually 
have contributed to de Gaulle’s hostility towards all integrative 
moves other than those strictly associated with financing the 
                                                          
74 T. OPPERMANN, op.cit., p.491. 
75 W. HALLSTEIN, BA N 1266-1756. 
76 L. LINDBERG, Decision-Making, op.cit., p.75. 
77 See, for example, de Gaulle’s press conference, 31 January 1964: 
‘obviously no country in Europe would agree to entrust its destiny to the 
control of an Areopagus composed of foreigners. In any case it is true for 
France’. (Cit. in The Monthly Bulletin of European Documentation, 2(1964), 
pp.5-6). 
 \\lse.ac.uk\storage\LIBRARY\Secondary\libfile\shared\repository\Content\White, J\Theory Guiding 





 Hallstein and the majority of the Commission, concerned 
with the logic of the enterprise, failed sufficiently to 
appreciate this. The words of Monnet’s memoirs are instructive: 
 
‘The majority of the Commission […] was impatient with the 
diplomats’ warnings: ‘De Gaulle will never accept it […]’ 
‘We shall see’, was the reply. […] Hallstein, Mansholt, and 
others believed that the French government would agree to 
that transfer [of sovereignty] as the price of Europe’s 
financing French farm exports. They also believed that the 
French, because of their intellectual training, could not 
resist the logic of the argument. Marjolin warned them: ‘For 
de Gaulle your logic is a trap, and he’ll smash it’.79 
 
According to Mayne, Hallstein was ‘completely flummoxed’ 
when the crisis broke out. ‘He rang up Monnet, and I was 
listening on the earphone, and he was just flabbergasted, he 
didn’t know what to say or what to think, because, he said, we’d 
not got to the end of the agenda’.80 
 
If the preconceptions of the policy-makers are evidenced by 
the March 1965 proposals themselves, they surely also account for 
the slowness with which the Commission responded to the warnings 
thereafter that consensus would not be reached in the Council of 
ministers when the time came to discuss them. Marjolin writes 
that ‘from March to June’, the Commission was ‘entrenched in the 
positions [it had adopted], stultified at once by the criticism 
to which it was being subjected and by the often embarrassing 
support it was receiving from certain frenzied anti-Gaullist 
quarters’. Not until July at the earliest did it ‘begin to think 
again’.81 It was for June, however, that two major meetings of 
the Council of ministers had been scheduled with the purpose of 
discussing the Commission’s proposals. Up to and during these 
negotiations, the Commission’s stance did not waver. Hallstein 
refused to see the package of proposals broken up into separate 
parts, as the French desired, and criteria of logic rather than 
consensus continued to be paramount to him. 
 
Given the Commission’s continued attachment to the 
principles that had led it to package its proposals in the first 
place, it was hardly surprising that the Council of ministers 
meetings on 13-15 and 28-30 June 1965 broke up without agreement. 
                                                          
78 See A. MORAVCSIK, De Gaulle between Grain and Grandeur …, (part 2), 
op.cit., pp.40-42. 
79 J. MONNET, Memoirs, Collins, London, 1978, pp.481-482. 
80 Interview, op.cit. 
81 R. MARJOLIN, Architect of European Unity …, op.cit., p.353. 
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The French, dogmatically pursuing their agenda as it was always 
likely that they would, refused to contemplate all other issues 
until the CAP funding question had been resolved to their 
preference. When such a resolution did not materialise by the 
agreed deadline of midnight 30 June, de Gaulle withdrew his 
representative Couve de Murville from the negotiations, and the 
crisis became public. 
 
 
Theory and Practice 
 
It has been the argument of this paper that the Commission 
proposals of 31 March 1965 were born of a set of beliefs about 
the nature of European integration markedly inspired by 
contemporary attempts in political science to conceptualise the 
process in theoretical terms. The proposals, it is argued, were a 
miscalculation. The crisis that followed was not the 
predetermined clash of two irreconcilable views, for it is 
assumed that de Gaulle realised that there were gains to be made 
for France in Europe, and consequently that it was not his aim 
simply to crush the European project for the sake of it.
82
 But 
once the Commission had come to develop the perspective on 
European integration that it did, the miscalculation that caused 
the triple deal to be formulated in such provocative terms was a 
natural consequence, and the unwillingness to moderate it 
thereafter entirely predictable. Moreover, the public 
articulation of this Commission perspective at various instances 
in the months before and during the crisis (repeated references, 
for example, to the ‘logic of integration’) meant that the 
Commission was likely to appear to onlookers as ‘scheming’ and 
goal-fixated, and therefore risked being cast by those with a 
grievance as an ideological opponent, intent on bringing about a 
hostile super-state.
83
    
 
The crisis which broke in July 1965 had severe consequences, 
not least in that it led to Hallstein’s position as President 
becoming untenable. It slowed the process of integration, and 
arguably weakened the Commission for up to two decades. If one 
                                                          
82 See W. LOTH, Hallstein und de Gaulle …, op.cit., pp.186-187. Cf. R. 
MARJOLIN (What Type of Europe?, in: D. BRINKLEY and C. HACKETT (eds.), Jean 
Monnet: The Path to European Unity, Macmillan, Basingstoke, 1991, p.164): ‘I 
personally was to find constant support in Paris for the completion of 
Europe’s construction as defined in the Treaty of Rome’. 
83 As well as de Gaulle’s press conference, 9 September 1965, one thinks of 
the accusation made by the Gaullist French MEP Jean de Lipkowski before the 
European Parliament on 20 October 1965: Hallstein and the Commission, he 
argued, were guilty of acting out of an ‘excess of logic’ (European Community, 
11(1965), p.6). 
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maintains that the influence of contemporary theoretical 
discourse was a central contributory factor in this political 
misadventure, it would seem natural to consider whether the 
scenario might have been avoided.  
 
Hallstein valued the work of Lindberg not just because he 
saw it as accurate, but because he felt it had impartiality and 
was protected from the concerns of those directly involved in the 
integration process. Such an assessment would seem to be 
problematic. As was emphasised at the very beginning of this 
piece, theorists tend to be more subjective than they suppose, or 
present themselves as being. The neofunctionalists were working 
to refine a theory which demonstrated the logical premises of 
integration; they would have wished, naturally enough, to see 
reality conform to their theory. Scheingold recalls that, when 
they were in Brussels in the mid-1960s, both he and Lindberg felt 
that Hallstein was acting with reference to a neofunctionalist 
logic. ‘It just seemed obvious that the clash between de Gaulle 
and Hallstein was like a real-world replication or reflection of 
the debate between Stanley Hoffmann [the Harvard professor, 
opposed to the neofunctionalist interpretation] and Ernie 
Haas’.84 One can imagine, then, that the lunchtime conversations 
that took place with members of the Commission in the winter 
1964-65 were not ‘objective’ in any real sense, since the 
academics were most definitely observing events with their own 
particular perspective in mind, and indeed since it would have 
been natural for them, for the sake of their theory’s accuracy, 
to encourage practitioners to act it out. 
 
Even if the Commission was determined to adopt some of the 
principles of neofunctionalism for practical purposes, it might 
still have been better advised not to voice the theoretical basis 
of its actions quite so openly. As Haas himself recognised after 
the event, it was the role of the Commission President to suggest 
policies that ‘happened’ to be integrative, rather than to 





There are also some points to be made about the formal side 
of policy-making. The March proposals, we are told, were drawn up 
under a certain amount of secrecy, by a small group consisting of 
the President and his closest aides, ‘the other members of the 
Commission being carefully kept out of the picture’.86 (That this 
                                                          
84 Correspondence, op.cit. 
85 E. HAAS, The Uniting of Europe and the Uniting of Latin America, in: 
Journal of Common Market Studies 5.4(1967), p.329. 
86 R. MARJOLIN, Architect of European Unity …, op.cit., p.350. 
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account is not simply motivated by the bitterness of an excluded 
Commissioner, Marjolin, seems to be borne out by its similarity 
with Mayne’s). The conditions invite reference to Irving Janis’ 
concept of ‘groupthink’, whereby policy-making is distorted by 
over-reliance on the views of key individuals and a failure to 
engage with countervailing perspectives.
87
 In this instance, the 
figure of Marjolin is significant: he was a Frenchman, with 
contacts in the French government, and was notoriously one of the 
more cautious pursuers of European integration in the Commission. 
Marjolin recalls: 
 
‘as soon as I had heard about it [the triple deal], I had 
stated my total opposition to what I regarded as an 
absurdity. […] I knew […], given the sentiments prevailing 
not only in Paris but also in government and civil service 
circles in the other capitals, that there was not the 
slightest chance of the project’s being accepted, or even of 
its being considered seriously’.88 
 
Mayne and Hans von der Groeben confirm that Marjolin made 
clear his opposition at the time.
89
 Even if his views were 
ultimately to have been over-ridden, had his scepticism been 
acknowledged during the formulation of the March proposals, 
rather than only when they had already been drawn up (and thus 
had assumed a degree of finality for their makers), it is 
conceivable that the proposals might have been cast in more 
moderate terms. The dissidence of Marjolin was too conveniently 
side-stepped.  
 
It was the initial premise of this inquiry, however, that 
policy decisions are made with reference to an ‘image’ of 
external reality which is a simplification, a schematisation, and 
as such always likely to be informed by the efforts of others to 
conceptualise likewise. In this case, the inclination to 
schematise was no doubt particularly strong: the EEC Commission 
had something of a ‘missionary’ quality in the 1960s, and its 
project of European integration was (and remains) a peculiarly 
attractive subject for theorisation, not least because the issues 
at stake are fairly easily identified, and thus a predictable 
pattern seems within reach. In this, it was perhaps singular. But 
the conclusions one can draw are in no way uniquely applicable. 
                                                          
87 I. JANIS, Groupthink, 2d ed., Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1982. Janis 
defines groupthink as ‘a mode of thinking that people engage in when they are 
deeply involved in a cohesive in-group, when the members’ strivings for 
unanimity override their motivation to realistically appraise alternative 
courses of action’ (p.9). 
88 R. MARJOLIN, Architect of European Unity …, op.cit., p.350. 
89 R. MAYNE, interview, op.cit.; H. VON DER GROEBEN, op.cit., pp.31-32. 
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Walter Hallstein, the former university professor, may have been 
likely to adopt an intellectual approach to his role as 
Commission President, but increasingly, in the West at least, 
those who take up policy-making posts do so after substantial 
periods spent in an academic environment, and are therefore 
susceptible to similar inclinations. Political science in the 
21
st
 century may well be more cautious in its approach than in 
the 1960s, but one need not suppose that its appeal to certain 




Today, just as in the Europe of the 1960s, the relationship 
between theoretical discourse and practical policy-making is 
reciprocal. Theoretical conceptualisations lie behind and often 
inspire practice, even if they do not alone determine it. 
Frequently-heard notions of a ‘Great Divide’ between two separate 
pursuits (often cast as ‘Truth’ and ‘Power’) are therefore 
misleading, for the division that they posit is artificial.
91
 
Even where this has been recognised, debate has still tended to 
focus on the implications of this fact for International 
Relations as a discipline, rather than on its implications for 
practical policy-making.
92
 Attention is frequently drawn to the 
dangers of political concerns being present in the process of 
knowledge-acquisition and theory-formulation; rarely, though, is 
similar attention paid to the significance of theoretical 
concerns being present in the formulation of practical policy.
93
 
This omission is one that has to be addressed, both by those who 
set political goals and design the policies to realise them, and 
by commentators who wish to examine and analyse the course of 
political events. 
                                                          
90 At a recent conference organised by The Royal Institute of International 
Affairs in London, several representatives of the practitioner community went 
out of their way to emphasise their receptivity to academic ideas as tools to 
aid them as they ‘wrestled with complexity’ in their daily professional lives. 
(Theory and Practice in International Relations: The Great Divide?, R.I.I.A., 
Chatham House, London, 22 November 2000). 
91 Cf. the title to the R.I.I.A. conference, above; see also W. WALLACE, Truth 
and Power, Monks and Technocrats: Theory and Practice in International 
Relations, in: Review of International Studies, 22(1996), pp.301-321. 
92 See for example K. BOOTH, Discussion: a Reply to William Wallace, in: 
Review of International Studies 23(1997), pp.371-377. Even Steve Smith, who 
provides a stimulating justification for seeing policy and theory as 
‘inexorably intertwined’, seems to be interested far more in the 
epistemological than the practical implications of this (S. SMITH, Power and 
Truth: a Reply to William Wallace, in: Review of International Studies 
23(1997), pp.507-516). 
93 As one of the very few examples of this linkage being explored, see an 
analysis by Alexander George (Bridging the Gap: Theory and Practice in Foreign 
Policy, United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington D.C., 1993) of US 
foreign policy towards Iraq in the years 1988-91. 
